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ABSTRACT: The paper provides a theory of interest rates determination in the informal credit market in 
backward agriculture highlighting the interactions between two informal sector lenders (a professional 
moneylender and a trader-interlocker) and explains the prevalence of different interest rates in the rural 
credit market. The trader and the moneylender play a non-cooperative game in choosing the extent of 
interlinkage and the non-interlinked informal interest rate, respectively. In the interlinked credit-product 
contract, the trader offers the interlockees a product price equal to the open market price and his entire 
surplus comes from his activities in the credit market. These results are completely opposite to those found 
in the existing literature on interlinkage. A price subsidy policy reduces the extent of interlinkage chosen by 
the trader while a credit subsidy policy may raise it. Besides, the subsidy policies unequivocally raise the 
non-interlinked informal interest rate of the moneylender but may lower the welfare of the farmers and the 
agricultural productivity. In this context, an alternative credit policy of forging a vertical linkage between 
the formal and informal credit markets has been considered. It has been found that a credit subsidy policy 
under the new system is able to raise the agricultural productivity and improve the welfare of the farmers 
by ameliorating their borrowing terms in the credit market. 
 
Keywords:  Trader, Moneylender, Formal credit, Informal credit, Interlinkage, Interest rate, Nash 
equilibrium, Subsidy policy, Vertical linkage. 
JEL classification: Q14; D89.   2 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TWO INFORMAL SECTOR LENDERS AND INTEREST 
RATE DETERMINATION IN THE INFORMAL CREDIT MARKET: A THEORETICAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
1.  Introduction: 
 
There are two sources of agricultural credit in a less developed economy such as India: the formal 
credit market, where loans come from the nationalized banks and cooperative credit societies; 
and, the informal credit market, where loans are advanced by professional moneylenders, traders, 
landlords etc. The share
1 of formal credit in Indian agriculture has increased from 7 percent in 
1950-51 to 63 percent in 1981-82. But despite an adequate supply of formal credit in many cases
2 
the small and marginal farmers in India depend on informal credit not least because formal credit 
is not available in time. 
 
There is empirical evidence of delay in disbursing formal credit. Sarap (1991) has observed that 
the small and marginal farmers face substantial delay in getting formal (short term) credit
3. 
Sarap’s empirical analysis is restricted to the villages of Sambalpur district of Orissa, India. The 
empirical analysis of Chaudhuri (1993) in the case of two selected villages of West Bengal, points 
out the same problem
4. This problem has also been observed by Bedbak (1986) who made a 
survey of a village of the Sonepur subdivision of Orissa. 
 
There may be several factors responsible for the delayed disbursement of formal credit to the 
small and marginal farmers. Among those factors, Sarap (1991) has emphasized factors such as 
the lower bargaining strength of the small farmers vis-à-vis large farmers, the bureaucratic and 
procedural formalities required, patronage, arbitrariness and the corrupt practices pursued by the 
officials of the formal credit agencies.  There are two theoretical papers by Chaudhuri and Gupta 
(1996) and Gupta and Chaudhuri (1997) which have provided theories of determination of the 
informal interest rate considering the interactions between the formal and informal sector lenders 
and bribe-taking by the formal sector lender. Unfortunately, neither of these two papers analyzes 
the interactions between the different informal sector lenders and provides explanation for the 
prevalence of different interest rates in the rural credit market. 
   3 
There are often more than one informal sector lenders in the rural credit market. Their mutual 
interactions play an important role in determination of the interest rates in the informal credit 
market. These rates take on a wide range of values, often within the same area
5. In the rural credit 
market, on the one hand, there are the professional moneylenders who charge exorbitantly high 
interest rates and on the other, there are the traders and landlords who offer interlinked contracts 
and charge subsidized interest rates.  
 
The present paper is devoted to a theoretical analysis of interest rates determination in the 
informal credit market taking into consideration interactions between two informal sector lenders 
when the market for informal credit is created by delayed disbursement of formal credit. The 
simplified story is the following. In the rural credit market there are a finite number of small 
farmers with each of them facing an exogenous delay in securing formal credit. There are two 
informal sector lenders − a professional moneylender and a trader. Each farmer may take 
informal credit either from the moneylender, repay the entire loan with interest when he receives 
formal credit and sell his product to government agencies at the procurement price or may be 
involved in an interlinked credit-product contract with the trader where he takes the production 
loan for the entire period from the trader and is bound to sell his output to the trader. The terms of 
the contract, namely the interest rate and the product price that the farmer receives are determined 
by the trader. The trader determines the extent of interlinkage i.e. the number of farmers with 
whom he comes into interlinked credit-product contract (ICPC), given the moneylender’s interest 
rate while the moneylender determines the interest rate charges on informal credit given the size 
of interlinkage chosen by the trader. Thus the moneylender and the trader play a non-cooperative 
game, choosing the size of interlinkage and the informal interest rate charged by the 
moneylender, and the equilibrium in the credit market may be viewed as a Nash equilibrium. 
 
This theoretical analysis leads to some interesting results. For example, in the interlinked 
contract, the trader earns zero trade profits. His entire income accrues from his activities in the 
credit market where he charges an interest rate, higher than his opportunity interest rate. All these 
results are contradictory to the standard results available in the literature on interlinkage that the 
trader supplies subsidized credit to the interlockees and his entire surplus comes from the product 
market (see Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987) and Chaudhuri and Gupta (1995b)). Also a price 
subsidy policy of the government reduces the extent of interlinkage chosen by the trader while a 
credit subsidy policy and / or a reduction in the delay of disbursement of formal credit may raise 
it. Besides, a price and / or a credit subsidy policy raises the informal interest rate of the   4 
moneylender but may lower the interest rate in the interlinked contract. So these policies are 
likely to widen the disparities between the two interest rates prevailing in the informal credit 
market. More importantly, the subsidy policies, designed to benefit the farmers, may worsen the 
welfare of the farmers as the informal sector lenders adjust their behaviour to appropriate the 
advantages of these policies. 
 
In this context, we have also considered an alternative credit policy where formal credit is not 
disbursed to the farmers directly. The informal sector lenders are treated as financial 
intermediaries between the formal credit agencies and the borrowers. The supply of subsidized 
formal credit to the informal sector lenders is expected to increase the degree of competitiveness 
among them, which may help to improve the borrowing terms faced by the small and marginal 
farmers. This can be thought of as a policy of forging a ‘vertical linkage’ between the formal and 
informal credit systems. We have found that under this new credit scheme, a credit subsidy policy 
succeeds in reducing the informal interest rate of the moneylender, ensuring better borrowing 
terms to the farmers in the credit market and in improving their welfare. 
 
2.  The Model: 
 
The model consists of N number of identical small farmers, one moneylender and one grain-
trader in the village retail market. There are two sources of rural credit: formal and informal. The 
agricultural crop-cycle is described by the time horizon [0,1]. The farmers do not get formal 
credit at the beginning of the crop-cycle. Formal credit is available at time T* > 0 such that T* ∈ 
[0,1]. So the farmers have to depend upon informal credit for carrying out their farming activities. 
The moneylender and the trader are the two sources of informal credit. The farmers may take 
informal credit either from the moneylender at the beginning of the crop-cycle and repay the 
entire informal loan plus interest accrued on it at time T* when he receives formal credit or may 
be involved in credit-product interlinkage with the trader where the informal credit for the entire 
crop-cycle is supplied by the trader. In the former case, each farmer is free to sell
6 his output to 
the State Purchasing Bodies (SPBs)
7 at the procurement price, Pf, and this we call a non-
interlinked credit-product contract (NICPC). On the contrary, in the latter case, each farmer is 
bound to sell his product to his creditor at a price determined by the latter. This we call an 
interlinked credit-product contract (ICPC). 
   5 
For the sake of simplicity, credit is considered as the only input of production
8. The relationship 
between the farmer’s output and the available credit, C, is given by Q = Q(C) with Q′(.) > 0 and 
Q″(.) < 0. The total number of farmers in the credit market is normalized to unity.  
 
2.1  The Reservation Income from NICPC  
 
At the beginning of the crop-cycle the farmer takes C amount of informal credit from the 
moneylender at the interest rate i per period. At time T*, when formal credit is available, he will 
take the amount ((1+iT*).C) of formal credit to repay the loan of the moneylender. Formal credit 
is held for the time interval [T*,1]. So if r is the interest rate on formal credit, the cost on formal 
credit is given by [(1+r.(1−T*))(1+iT*)C], where [(1+r(1−T*))(1+iT*)] is the effective price of 
formal credit over the entire crop-cycle. 
 
The farmer maximizes his profit, defined as the excess of sales revenue over the interest cost. The 
demand function for loans is obtained from his profit-maximizing behaviour. The profit of the 
farmer, YF, is given by 
YF = Pf.Q(C) − [(1+r(1−T*))(1+iT*)].C                                         (1) 
The procurement price of the crop, Pf, and the formal interest rate, r, are administratively 
determined. YF is maximized with respect to C and the first-order condition of maximization is 
given by 
Pf.Q′(.) = [(1+r(1−T*))(1+iT*)]                                                         (2) 
 
Equation (2) states that the VMP of credit must equal the effective price of formal credit over the 
entire crop-cycle. The optimum amount of credit application of each farmer, denoted C*, is found 
by solving equation (2) as folows: C* = C*(Pf, i, r, T*). C* is an increasing function of Pf and a 
decreasing function of both i and r. C* is also a decreasing function of T* if 1 ≥ 2T* (see 
appendix I). Now putting C = C* into equation (1) we obtain the reservation income of each 
farmer as the following. 
YF* = Pf.Q(C*) − [(1+r(1−T*))(1+iT*)].C*                                    (3) 
 
The reservation income of the farmer plays a crucial role when the trader offers him an ICPC. No 
farmer will accept an ICPC if the terms of the contract fail to ensure an income of at least YF*. 
   6 
2.2  The ICPC 
 
In an ICPC, the farmer takes his entire production loan from the trader at the interest rate k1 per 
period and in turn he is bound to sell his entire output to the latter at a price P1 per unit. The 
income of the farmer with an ICPC is given by 
YF = P1.Q(C) − (1+k1).C                                                (4) 
This is maximized with respect to C. The first-order condition of maximization is 
P1.Q′(C) = (1+k1)                                                          (5) 
The farmer’s optimum demand for credit is found by solving equation (5) as: C
0 = C
0(P1, k1). 
Inserting C = C




0                                                              (6) 
The farmer will accept an ICPC if and only if 
YF
0 ≥ YF*                                        (7) 
 
With an ICPC, the income of the trader includes trade profits and net interest income. The trader 
purchases Q(C
0) amount of output from each farmer at a price P1 per unit and sells it in the open 
market at the price PT and thus earns (PT − P 1).Q(C
0) amount of trade profits. Besides his net 
interest income from each farmer is (k1 − k).C
0, where k is the opportunity interest rate of the 




0]                                              (8) 
where n is the fraction of total number of farmers with whom the trader comes into interlinkage. 
YT is maximized through a choice of P1 and k1 and subject to the reservation income constraint of 
each farmer given by (7). 
 
We here follow a principal-agent framework with the trader as the principal and each farmer as 
the agent. The principal maximizes the joint income (his income plus that of each farmer) through 
a choice of C
0. The farmer behaves efficiently and gets only his reservation level of income out of 
the maximized joint income since the trader has sufficient instruments at his disposal, namely P1 
and k1 to push the former to the reservation income level and to appropriate the remaining surplus 
from the contract.  So in equilibrium we must have 
YF
0 = YF*                                                                  (9) 
Given the current state of the literature on the principal-agent models applied to the agrarian 
sector, all the above results are well established in the literature. See for example, Gangopadhyay   7 
and Sengupta (1987), Chaudhuri and Gupta (1995a,b), Gangopadhyay (1994), Chaudhuri (1996) 
etc. 
 
An ICPC is optimal to the trader since it yields a higher level of income vis-à-vis an NICPC
9. 
This implies that given PT and k, there will occur a corner solution i.e. n = 1 in equilibrium. Thus 
in equilibrium the demand for loan that the moneylender faces will be zero unless the marginal 
cost of funds of the trader increases with an increase in the loaned amount 
10 i.e. k = k(nC
0) with 
k′(.) > 0 and k″(.) = 0   
11. 
This leads to the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: A necessary condition for the moneylender to face a positive demand for 
informal credit is that the opportunity interest rate of the trader must be an increasing function of 
the loaned amount. 
 
When k is an increasing function of the loaned amount, the first-order condition of maximization 
of YT (after using equation (9)) is given by 
PT.Q′(C
0) = 1 + k(nC
0) + k′(.).nC
0                                                 (10) 
Thus the trader equates the VMP of credit to his marginal cost of the loan in equilibrium. In 
equation (10) ((1 + k(nC
0) + k′(.).nC
0)/PT) is the real marginal cost of credit. As PT increases or n 
decreases the real marginal cost decreases. The law of diminishing marginal productivity of credit 
ensures an inverse relationship between the optimum use of credit and its real marginal cost. So 
C
0 increases as PT increases or n decreases and vice versa (see appendix I). The trader’s income 
maximizing C
0 can be found as a function of PT and n from equation (10). Equations (5) and (9) 
are then solved simultaneously to find out the optimum values of the terms of the contract as 
functions of the size of interlinkage, n. 
 




0 − Pf.Q(C*) + (1+iT*).(1+r(1−T*)).C*]            (8.1) 
 
The trader maximizes YT with respect to n. The informal interest rate of the moneylender, i, is 
treated as given in the maximization process because both the trader and the moneylender act as 
followers in this game. Maximizing YT with respect to n, we get the following first-order 
condition.   8 
(∂YT/∂n) = PT.Q(C
0) − (1+k(.))C
0 − Pf.Q(C*) + (1+iT*)(1+r(1−T*))C* 
                                                                                       − k′(.).n.(C
0)





2 = YF*                                                       (11.1) 
The second-order condition of maximization is also satisfied i.e. (∂
2YT/∂n
2) < 0 (see appendix I). 
 
Equation (11.1) states that the marginal gain of the trader of interlinking one additional farmer 
must equal the reservation income of the latter. This is shown in figure 1 where aYT is the 
marginal income curve of the trader. This a negatively sloped curve since the marginal income of 
the trader decreases with an increase in the value of n (note that from the second-order condition 
of income maximization of the trader, (∂
2YT/∂n
2 < 0)). OC is the reservation income of the 
farmer. This curve is horizontal because YF* is independent of n. In figure 1, b is the equilibrium 
point where the equilibrium condition given by equation (11) is satisfied. n
0 is the equilibrium 
level of interlinkage. ∆abc is the measure of surplus income appropriated by the trader by 
interlinking n
0 fraction of the total number of farmers. 
 
(Space for figure 1) 
 




0] = Pf.[Q(C*) − Q′(C*).C*]                               (14) 




0] = Pf.[Q(C*) − Q′(C*).C*]                                (15) 




0] < [Q(C*) − Q′(C*).C*] 
or, Q(C
0) < Q(C*). So when the opportunity cost of the loan of the trader is an increasing function 
of the loaned amount and there is imperfection in the product market, the ICPC is less productive 
(from the viewpoint of agricultural productivity) vis-à-vis an NICPC. 
By (14) and (15) it now follows that 
P1 = PT                                                      (16) 
So in an ICPC the trader offers the farmer a price of the crop which is equal to its open market 
price. Thus the trader earns zero trade profit in this model. His gains from interlinkage (∆abc in 
figure 1) entirely come from his dealings in the credit market. It then trivially follows that 
(1+iT*)(1+r(1−T*)) < k1 > k(nC
0) i.e. the interest rate on the informal credit in the ICPC must be   9 
greater than both the opportunity cost of the loan of the trader and the effective price of credit in 
the NICPC over the entire crop-cycle.  
 
The above results are quite significant because these are contradictory to the proposition of the 
Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987) paper that the trader supplies credit to the farmer at a 
subsidized interest rate and offers a price of the crop which is less than the open market price. 
Such contradictions basically originate from the differences in the assumption regarding the 
opportunity interest rate of the trader between these two models. While in Gangopadhyay and 
Sengupta (1987) this opportunity interest rate was taken as datum, in the present paper it has been 
assumed as an increasing function of the loaned amount. Therefore, the trader in the present case 
unlike the Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987) case does not find any incentive to supply 
subsidized credit to the farmers and improve agricultural productivity. The above results are 
presented in the form of the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: In the ICPC the trader offers the farmer a price of the crop which is equal to 
its open market price and charges an interest rate that is greater than both the opportunity cost of 
the loan of the trader and the effective interest rate on formal credit (over the entire crop-cycle) in 
an NICPC. 
 
Equation (11.1) is the reaction function of the trade, which shows how the trader will react in 
terms of n following a change in i by the moneylender. 
 
If the moneylender raises his interest rate on informal credit i, the reservation level of income of 
each farmer YF* decreases (see appendix I). Thus YF* curve in figure 1 shifts downward. The 
trader raises n to satisfy equation (11.1). Thus n increases when i increases. Hence the trader’s 
reaction curve TT, representing equation (11.1) must slope positively in the i−n space (see figure 
2). 
 
When Pf  increases and / or r decreases YF* increases. The YF* curve in figure 1 shifts upward. 
The trader lowers n given the moneylender’s interest rate, i. Thus the TT curve shifts upward to 
the left as Pf increases and / or r decreases. If T* is lowered the effective price of formal credit 
over the entire crop-cycle decreases and as a consequence YF* increases if 1 ≥ 2T* (see appendix 
I). So the YF* curve in figure 1 shifts upward. The trader’s income maximizing value of n 
increases given i. The reaction curve of the trader, TT, shifts upward to the left as T* decreases.               10 
3. The Moneylender’s Behaviour in an NICPC and Reaction Curve  
       
The demand for informal credit that the moneylender faces at the beginning of the crop-cycle 
from each farmer is C*. But informal credit is held by the farmer for the time interval [0,T*], 
because at time T*, formal credit is available and the farmer pays back the informal loan with 
interest. Let g = g((1−n).C*) be the opportunity rate of return of funds of the moneylender and g′ 
(.) > 0 and g″(.) = 0. Here (1−n) is the number of farmers who take informal credit from the 
moneylender. Then the aggregate net interest income of the moneylender is 
YM  = (iT* − g((1 – n)C*).C*T*(1 – n) = (i – g(.))C*T*(1 – n)                                  (12)  
The moneylender maximizes YM with respect to i, given n because both the moneylender and the 
trader act as followers in this game. Maximizing YM with respect to i, we get the following first-
order condition
12: 
C* − g′(.)(1 – n)C*.(∂C*/∂i) + (i − g)(∂C*/∂i) = 0                                            (13) 
 
Equation (13) states that the marginal net interest income (with respect to i) of the moneylender 
must be equal to zero in equilibrium. When the trader raises the extent of interlinkage n, the 
marginal net interest income (with respect to i) of the moneylender falls since g′(.) > 0; g″(.) = 0 
and (∂C*/∂i) < 0 . So the moneylender now lowers the interest rate he charges on informal credit. 
So i decreases when n increases. Hence equation (13) should represent a negatively sloped curve 
in the i−n space and this is the reaction curve of the moneylender. It is denoted by MM (see figure 
2). 
 
We note that C* is an increasing function of Pf , a decreasing function of both i and r and also a 
decreasing function of T* if  1 ≥ 2T*. So if the procurement price Pf  increases and / or the formal 
interest rate r decreases and / or the delay of the disbursement of the formal credit decreases, the 
demand for informal credit C* increases. Even at the same value of n, the marginal net interest 
income (with respect to i) of the moneylender increases. Thus the moneylender raises the 
informal interest rate i. This implies that the MM curve in figure 2 shifts upward to the right 
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4. Nash Equilibrium and Comparative Static Exercises: 
 
This is a game between the trader and the moneylender, both acting as followers. Nash 
equilibrium is attained at the point of intersection of the two reaction curves. This is shown in 
figure 2. The equilibrium point e is unique since the trader’s reaction curve is always positively 
sloped and the MM curve always slopes negatively. We assume that the slope of the TT curve 
exceeds the absolute value of the slope of the MM curve. This ensures that the equilibrium point e 
in figure 2 is stable. 
 
(Space for figure 2) 
 
 
4.1. Effects of Price and Credit Subsidy Policies and a reduction of Delay in Disbursement    
       of Formal Credit on the Moneylender’s interest rate and the Extent of Interlinkage 
        
A price subsidy policy implies an increase in the procurement price of the crop received by the 
farmers in an NICPC, Pf. On the other hand, a credit subsidy policy means lowering the interest 
rate on formal credit r. Besides if the government undertakes a policy to reduce the delay of 
disbursement of formal credit, T* takes a lower value. 
 
If Pf increases and /or r decreases and /or T* decreases the TT curve shifts upward to the left. The 
MM curve, on the other hand, shifts upward to the right. The new equilibrium point lies to the 
north of the previous one. In all these cases, the informal interest rate charged by the moneylender 
i takes a higher value. This establishes the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 3: A price and /or a credit subsidy policy unambiguously raise the informal 
interest rate of the moneylender. A reduction in the delay of disbursement of formal credit also 
raises the moneylender’s interest rate if 1≥ 2T*. 
 
An increase in Pf  and /or a decrease in r raises the reservation level of income of each farmer, 
YF*, directly. However these policies also raise the informal interest rate of the moneylender (see 
proposition 3) which reduces Yf* indirectly. In the case of a price subsidy policy the direct 
expansionary effect on YF* outweighs the indirect contractionary effect. So YF* increases as Pf 
increases which in turn raises the marginal cost of interlinkage of the trader while the marginal   12 
gain from interlinkage remains unchanged. Thus the trader finds it profitable to reduce the extent 
of interlinkage. So n decreases as Pf increases. However, in the case of a credit subsidy policy, the 
direct expansionary effect on YF* is greater than (equal to) (less than) the indirect contractionary 
effect on YF* if and only if E
13  < (=) > 1 where E = (− C*.Q″(C*)/Q′(C*)) is the elasticity of the 
marginal product curve of credit. Thus the extent of interlinkage falls (remains unchanged) 
(increases) due to a credit subsidy policy if and only if the elasticity of the marginal product curve 
of credit is less than (equal to) (greater than) unity. 
 
If the farmer receives formal credit earlier, the value of T* falls. A fall in T* raises YF* directly if 
1≥ 2T*. It also raises the moneylender’s interest rate, i, which reduces YF* indirectly. The direct 
expansionary effect on YF* is outweighed by the indirect contractionary effect if the elasticity of 
the marginal product curve of credit, E, is greater than or equal to unity. So if 1≥ 2T* and E ≥1, 
the net marginal gain of the trader from interlinkage rises which raises the extent of interlinkage 
in the new equilibrium. So we have the following proposition
14. 
                 
PROPOSITION 4: (i) A price subsidy policy always lowers the extent of interlinkage, (ii) a 
credit subsidy policy lowers (does not change) (raises) the extent of interlinkage if and only if E < 
(=) > 1, and, (iii) a reduction in the delay of disbursement of formal credit raises the extent of 
interlinkage if 1≥ 2T* and E ≥1. 
 
4.2  Effects on the Informal Interest Rate in the ICPC: 
 
The price of the crop in the ICPC, P1, does not change as Pf (or r or T*) changes. This is because 
P1 = PT always and PT is a parameter in the system. However, the interest rate in the ICPC k1 
changes due to a change in Pf  (or r or T*). Differentiating both sides of equation (5) with respect 




0/∂n)(dn/dPf) < 0                                 (14.1) 




0/∂n).(dn/dr)                                       (14.2) 
                         (−)          (−) 
           < (=) (>) 0 if and only if (dn/dr) < (=) (>) 0   13 
                           or if and only if E > (=) (<) 1 
                           where E = (− C
0.Q″(C
0)/Q′(C
0)) is the elasticity of the MP curve of credit. 
and, (dk1/dT*) = P1.Q″(C
0)(∂C
0/∂n)(dn /dT*)                           (14.3) 
                        < 0 if (i) E≥ 1 
                            and (ii) 1≥2T* 
 
The credit intensity of cultivation of any farmer in the ICPC C
0 is a decreasing function of the 
extent of interlinkage n. As the procurement price of the crop, Pf, increases, n decreases which in 
turn raises C
0. But from equation (5) it follows that C
0 can increase only when the rate of interest 
on informal credit in the ICPC, k1, is lowered (note that P1 is a constant). So k1 is lowered when 
Pf increases. On the other hand, as the formal interest, r, decreases due to a credit subsidy policy n 
falls (remains unchanged) (rises) if and only if E < (=) (>) 1. As a consequence k1 is lowered 
(kept unchanged) (raised) if and only if E < (=) (>) 1.Besides a fall in the delay of disbursement 
of formal credit T* raises n if E≥1 and 1≥2T*. If these sufficient conditions are met n rises 
which in turn reduces C
0 and as a consequence k1 has to rise. So we have the following 
proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: (i) A price subsidy always lowers the interest rate in the ICPC, (ii) a credit 
subsidy policy lowers (does not change) (raises) the interest rate in the interlinked contract if and 
only if E < (=) (>) 1and, (iii) a reduction in the delay of disbursement of formal credit raises the 
informal interest rate k1 if E ≥1 and 1≥2T*. 
 
 
4.3 Effects of Subsidy Policies on the Welfare of the Farmers and Agricultural Productivity  
 
The farmers always remain on their reservation income level. So the effects of the subsidy 
policies on the welfare of the farmers are equivalent to the effects of these policies on their 
reservation level of income. Applying the envelope theorem, from (3) one can derive the 
following expressions. 
(dYF*/dPf) = Q(C*) − (1+r.(1−T*)).C*.T*.(di/dPf)                  ) 
and,                                                                 (+)                      )                   (15) 
(dYF*/dr) = − [(1−T*)(1+iT*) + (1+r.(1−T*).T*.(di/dr)].C*    ) 
                                                                               (−)   14 
The signs of both  (dYF*/dPf) and (dYF*/dr) are ambiguous. The reservation income of each 
farmer, YF* is a positive function of the procurement price of the crop and a negative function of 
both the formal and informal interest rates. An increase in the procurement price of the crop, Pf or 
a decrease in the formal interest rate, r raises YF* directly. However, an increase in Pf or a 
decrease in r leads to an increase in the informal interest rate of the moneylender, i (see 
proposition 3) which in turn produces an induced contractionary effect on YF*. Thus the net 
effect of the subsidy policies on YF* is uncertain. Also as i increases due to the subsidy policies, 
the effect on the real marginal cost of credit, ((1+r(1−T*))(1+iT*)/P) is uncertain. As a 
consequence the effect of the subsidy policies on the agricultural productivity, Q(C*) is 
ambiguous. This leads to the following proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 6: A price and /or a credit subsidy policy may not be able to raise the 
reservation level of income (and hence the welfare) of the farmers and the agricultural 
productivity. 
 
It is a matter of deep concern that in the presence of any credit market distortion (e.g. a delay in 
disbursement of formal credit) the subsidy policies of the government designed to benefit the 
farmers may not benefit them at all as the two lenders in the informal credit market – the trader 
(interlocker) and the moneylender adjust their behaviour to appropriate the advantages of these 
policies. Thus there is little justification to continue with the subsidy policies in the presence of 
any distortion in the formal credit market. Chaudhuri and Gupta (1996) has also come to the same 
broad conclusion in the presence of strategic delay in the distribution of formal credit and bribe-
taking by the official of the formal credit agency. We here have, however, been able to show the 
perverse effects of the subsidy policies even without considering the case of strategic delay (and 
hence the bribe-taking by the bank official).  
 
5.  An Alternative Credit Policy: 
              
Any credit market imperfection in backward agriculture, e.g. the existence of a delay in 
disbursement of formal credit, cannot be solved administratively in the presence of the existing 
power structure of the rural society (see Sarap (1991)). Thus if our objective is to provide credit 
to the small and marginal farmers at a subsidized rate we need an alternative credit policy which 
will be able to deliver the goods even in the existing circumstances. There is no doubt that the 
informal sector lenders are in a better position to forward and recover loans from the small   15 
borrowers than formal credit agencies are. So an alternative credit policy may be not to try to 
replace the informal credit system horizontally by the formal one, but to encourage the informal 
sector lenders by enhancing their credit worthiness with adequate supply of subsidized credit. The 
informal sector lenders e.g. traditional moneylenders, large landowners or grain traders are in a 
much better position to put up collaterals: from the view point of the formal credit agencies they 
are good credit risks. The supply of subsidized formal credit to the informal sector lenders 
(existing or potential) is expected to aggrandize the degree of competitiveness among them which 
helps to improve the borrowing terms faced by the small and marginal farmers who do not have 
access to the formal credit system. This can be thought of as a policy of forging ‘vertical’ links 
between the informal and formal credit systems. This is, by no means, a new idea. This policy has 
already been applied to the agricultural sector of Philippines with some success (see Umali 
(1990)). We shall, in this section of the paper, judge the effectiveness of such an alternative credit 
policy on the borrowing terms faced by the farmers and their welfare and on the agricultural 
productivity of the economy. 
 
Let us consider a situation where subsidized formal credit is not disbursed directly to the farmers 
and a fraction β of the total amount of credit advanced by each informal sector-lender
15 (the 
trader and the moneylender) is met by taking a loan from the formal credit agency at an interest 
rate r per period. The value of β is administratively determined. In this case the reservation 
income of each farmer is 
YF* = Pf.Q(C*) – (1+i).C*                         (3.1) 
Note that the farmer takes his entire loan from the moneylender and sells his product to the state 
purchasing bodies at the procurement price, Pf. 
 
The income of the trader-interlocker would be 
YT = n.[PT.Q(C




O]                             (8.1) 
Here nC
O is the total amount of credit advanced by the trader, β fraction of which is obtained 
from the formal credit agency at the interest rate r per period and for the remaining (1−β) fraction, 
the opportunity interest rate is k((1−β)nC
O) per period. When YT is maximized with respect to C
O, 
the previous first-order condition (equation (10)) would be replaced by the following. 
PT.Q′(C
O) = (1−β).(1+k(.)) + k′(.).(1−β)
2.nC
O + (1+r)β                            (10.1) 
Note that the productivity of each farmer in the ICPC, C
O now increases if r decreases following a 
credit subsidy policy.   16 
 
When YT is maximized with respect to n given i, the previous first-order condition (equation 






2  = YF*                      (11.2) 
This is the new reaction function of the trader. From (11.2) we should note that as previously this 
is also represented by a positively sloped curve (TT) in the (i,n) space and that the TT curve shifts 
upward to the left as Pf increases (see figure 2). Also as r falls due to a credit subsidy policy, the 
marginal gain of the trader from interlinking one additional farmer (the left-hand side of (11.2)) 
increases while the reservation income of the farmer, YF* does not change. So the trader would 
increase n, the extent of interlinkage given the moneylender’s interest rate, i. Hence the reaction 
curve of the trader, TT (in figure 2) shifts to right following a credit subsidy policy. 
 
On the other hand, the moneylender’s income in this case is given by 
YM = [i − β.r − (1−β).g((1−β)(1−n)C*)](1−n)C*                                               (12.1) 
The moneylender maximizes YM with respect to i, taking n as datum. The new first-order 
condition is 
C* + [i − βr − (1−β).g(.)].(∂C*/∂i) − (1−β)
2.g′(.).(1−n).C*.(∂C*/∂i) = 0             (13.1) 
 
Equation (13.1) is the new reaction function of the moneylender. One can check that like the 
previous case, it is also represented by a negatively sloped curve MM in figure 2) and the MM 
curve shifts upward to the right following a price subsidy policy. However, as the formal interest 
rate, r, decreases due to a credit subsidy policy, the marginal net interest income of the 
moneylender (with respect to i) decreases. So to satisfy equation (13.1) i decreases as r decreases. 
This implies that the MM curve shifts downward to the left due to a credit subsidy policy. 
 
Owing to a credit subsidy policy the TT curve shifts to the right while the MM curve shifts 
downward to the left (in figure 2). As a consequence, the equilibrium informal interest rate of the 
moneylender, i decreases due to a credit subsidy policy. From (3.1) one can check that the 
reservation level of income and hence welfare of each farmer increases as i decreases following a 
credit subsidy policy. As their reservation income level increases, the borrowers also face better 
terms in the interlinked contracts offered by the trader. This will also raise the agricultural 
productivity in both interlinked and non-interlinked systems since the real marginal cost of credit 
decreases. However, the effects of a price subsidy policy on the informal interest rate, agricultural   17 
productivity and on the farmers’ welfare are qualitatively the same as before. So we have the 
following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 7: A policy of forging a vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit 
markets in backward agriculture leads to (i) a decrease in the informal interest rate of the 
moneylender and hence an improvement in the borrowing terms of the farmers in the credit 
market, (ii) an unequivocal improvement in the welfare of the farmers and, (iii) an increase in 
agricultural productivity.  
 
6.  Concluding Remarks: 
 
In this paper we have presented a theory of interest rates determination in the informal credit 
market when there is a market for informal credit. The paper analyzes interactions between two 
informal sector lenders and provides explanation for the prevalence of different interest rates in 
the rural credit market. There are two informal sector lenders in the model – a trader-cum-
interlocker and a pure moneylender. A farmer may take credit either from the moneylender and 
sell his product to the state purchasing bodies at the procurement price of the crop or accept the 
offer of an ICPC by the trader. The trader determines the number of farmers with whom he comes 
into interlinkage given the moneylender’s interest rate while the moneylender, on the other hand, 
determines the interest rate charges on informal credit and hence the reservation income of each 
farmer, given the size of interlinkage chosen by the trader. The trader and the moneylender then 
play a non-cooperative game, both acting as followers. This game leads to some interesting 
results. For example, in the interlinked contract, the trader earns zero trade profits. His entire 
income accrues from the credit market where he charges an interest rate, greater than his 
opportunity cost of the loan. All these results are contradictory to the standard results available in 
the literature on interlinkage that the trader supplies subsidized credit to the interlockees and his 
entire surplus comes from his activities in the product market (Gangopadhyay and Sengupta 
(1987)). The unusual results in this model are due to the fact that the trader’s opportunity cost of 
credit is an increasing function of the volume of credit advanced by the trader-cum-interlocker to 
his clients. Also a price subsidy policy of the government reduces the extent of interlinkage 
chosen by the trader while a credit subsidy policy and / or a reduction in the delay of 
disbursement of formal credit may raise it. Besides, a price and /or a credit subsidy policy raises 
the informal interest rate of the moneylender but may lower the interest rate in the interlinked 
contract. So these policies are likely to widen the disparities between the two interest rates   18 
prevailing in the informal credit market. More importantly, the subsidy policies, designed to 
benefit the farmers, may worsen the welfare of the farmers and lower agricultural productivity as 
the informal sector lenders adjust their behaviour to appropriate the benefits of these policies. If 
there is any imperfection in the formal credit market, the subsidy policies may produce perverse 
results (see Chaudhuri and Gupta (1996)).  
 
In this context, we have considered an alternative credit policy
16 where formal credit is not 
disbursed to the farmers directly. The informal sector lenders are treated as financial 
intermediaries between the formal credit agencies and the borrowers. The supply of subsidized 
formal credit to the informal sector lenders (existing or potential) will increase the degree of 
competitiveness among them which helps to improve the borrowing terms faced by the small and 
marginal farmers. This can be thought of as a policy of forging a ‘vertical’ linkage between the 
informal and formal credit systems. We have found that under this new credit scheme, a credit 
subsidy policy succeeds in reducing the informal interest rate of the moneylender, raising the 
agricultural productivity, ensuring better borrowing terms to the farmers in the credit market and 
in improving their welfare. It is, of course, true that the informal sector lenders also do reap a part 
of the benefits of the credit subsidy policy, but this policy certainly is able to enhance 
competitiveness between the lenders and thereby compel them to pass on some of the benefits to 
the borrowers which the traditional credit policy fails to deliver.  
 
There are, however, a few criticisms against the policy of vertical linkage. For example, Hoff and 
Stiglitz (1996) have argued that an expansion of formal credit to the informal credit market would 
pave the way for the entry of new informal sector lenders into the market which, in turn, would 
make loan recovery more difficult leading to an increase in the costs of loan enforcement for 
every lender. As a consequence, the informal sector interest rates may go up instead of falling.  
Against this criticism, we may argue that the informal sector lenders, generally do not lend to 
those borrowers over whom they do not possess some control (see Aleem (1993), Ray (1998)). 
Besides, Floro and Ray (1997) have shown  that a credit flow to the lenders in the informal credit 
market exerts downward pressure on informal interest rates and raises total credit outlay by the 
informal sector lenders when the lenders are engaged in myopic competition among them. 
However, this policy may strengthen the ability and incentive of the informal sector lenders to 
collude among themselves which would result in a worse terms faced by the informal borrowers. 
In defense, we may refer to a recent paper by Chaudhuri and Dwibedy (1998), where it has been 
shown that even if the informal sectors lenders are allowed to collude and maximize their joint   19 
income, the resulting informal sector interest rate would still be lower than that under the 
traditional credit policy. So there is still merit in advocating in favour of this credit policy and that 
is why it has been successfully followed in Philippines over the last few decades. There is an 





1  It includes cooperatives, government and commercial banks. These figures are obtained from 
the All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey 1961-62 and 1981, published by the Reserve 
Bank of India. 
2  This is not true for the whole of the rural economy of India. In many cases, the informal 
credit market exists because the supply of formal credit is inadequate. 
3  See table 3, chapter 3 of Sarap (1991). 
4  In the two villages, Hazipur and Bara-shimuliya, farmers with less than 1.5 acres of land-
holding had to wait for eight weeks to get loans from the date of application. 
5  See Basu (1998), chapter 13. 
6  The small farmers are denied accessibility to the open (wholesale) market of the crop, which 
is accessible to the trader. This implies imperfection in the product market. This may be due 
to many factors. See Rudra (1982), chapter 3 for details. 
7  Assume that the government conducts the procurement of the crop – a practice followed in 
India in the case of food-grains and some commercial crops. 
8  Any production function that is well behaved may be written as a function of the total 
expenditure provided input-markets are perfectly competitive. Consequently the production 
function can be interpreted as a general production relationship with many inputs under 
competitive conditions. 
9  See Chaudhuri and Gupta (1995a,b) and Chaudhuri (1996) for the proof. 
10  The lenders in the rural credit market generally borrow funds from the urban sector and re-
lend it to the borrowers in the rural credit market. The assumption that the opportunity cost 
of funds of the rural lenders is an increasing function of the loaned amount may be justified 
by using the ‘Lender’s risk hypothesis’. On the other hand, if a lender in the rural credit 
market uses his owns funds for lending, he may alternatively invest his money in any 
profitable production activity with diminishing returns to credit. If the lender now withdraws 
larger and larger sums from production, the marginal product of credit in the alternative use   20 
increases and, therefore, the opportunity cost of the lender’s funds also rises. Besides, it is 
beyond any doubt that there must be some cost associated with the formation of interlinked 
contracts e.g. cost relating to collection of information about the clients and enforcement of 
contracts that are quite high in a backward rural economy. g(.) captures all such costs. The 
larger the size of interlinkage the higher will be the above associated costs. Thus the 
assumption g′(.) > 0 is fully justified. 
11  This is a simplifying assumption. This means that the opportunity cost of funds of the lender 
is a linear function of the loaned amount. 
12  The second-order condition of maximization is satisfied by the assumption that g″(.) = 0 and 
ignoring the third-order derivative of the production function. 
13  For the production functions: Q = logC
b and Q = (logC)
(1/b) ; b > 1, E is equal to unity and 
greater than unity, respectively. But for the Cobb-Douglas type production function, e.g. Q = 
A.(C)
β ; A > 0, 1 > β > 0, E is less than unity. 
14  Interested readers can check these results or can obtain the mathematical proofs from the 
author on request. 
15  Here 0 < β < 1. This implies that the moneylender and the trader  face credit constraint in the 
formal credit market.  
16  Another approach may be to actually design credit institutions at the micro level that will 
take advantage of local information in innovative ways. The leading example of small-scale 
lending or micro-finance is the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. See Ray (1998), ch.14 and 
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Appendix I: 
 
1.Totally differentiating equation (10) one can easily derive  
    (∂C
0/∂n) = (2k′(.)C
0) / [PT.Q″(C
0) − 2k′(.).n]                     (A.1) 
                          (+)                  (−)           (+) 
               <  0. 
   So C
0 is a decreasing function of n. 
 
2. Differentiating equation (11) with respect to n we get the second-order condition for 
maximization of YT as 
(∂
2YT/∂n









0) − 2k′(.).n))]            (using A.1) 




0) − 2k′(.)n)]                     (A.2) 
                  < 0. 
So the second order condition for maximization of YT holds. 
 
3. Totally differentiating equation (2) and after replacing C by C* one can derive the 
following results: 
 
(∂C*/∂i) = [(1+r(1−T*))T*/Pf.Q″(C*)] < 0 
(∂C*/∂r) = [(1−T*)(1+iT*)/Pf Q″(C*)] <0                                               (A.3) 
(∂C*/∂T*) = [((i−r) + i.r(1−2T*))/Pf Q″(C*)] < 0 if 1≥2T*                       
(∂C*/∂Pf) = − (Q′(C*) /Pf Q″(C*)) >0 
 
 
4. Using the envelope theorem, from equation (3) we can derive the following results: 
 
(∂YF*/∂Pf) = Q(C*) > 0 
(∂YF*/∂i) = − (1+r(1−T*))C*T* < 0                                    
(∂YF*/∂r) = − (1+iT*)C*(1−T*) < 0                                       (A.4)                                  
      (∂YF*/∂T*) = − [(i−r) + i.r(1−2T*)] < 0 if 1≥2T*         
   23 
So the reservation level of income of each farmer YF* is an increasing function of Pf but a 




Putting the value of (∂C*/∂i) from (A.3) into equation (13) we get 
C*[Pf.Q″(C*) − g′.(1−n)T*(1+r(1−T*))]+ (i−g)T*(1+r(1−T*)) = 0                          (13.1) 
 
Totally differentiating equation (13.1) we get 
[(∂C*/∂i).di + (∂C*/∂Pf)dPf + (∂C*/∂r)dr + (∂C*/∂T*)dT*].[PfQ″(C*) − g′.(1−n)T*(1+r(1−T*))] + 
C*[Q″(C*)dPf + g′.T*(1+r(1−T*))dn  − g ′.(1−n)T*(1−T*)dr  − g ′.(1−n)(1+r(1−T*))dT*] 
+T*(1+r(1−T*))di  − g ′.T*(1+r(1−T*)).[− C*dn + (1−n)(∂C*/∂Pf)dPf + (1−n)(∂C*/∂r)dr + 
(1−n)(∂C*/∂i)di + (1−n)(∂C*/∂T*)dT*] + (i−g)T*(1−T*)dr + (i−g).(1+r.(1−2T*))dT* = 0 
 
or, i2di + n2dn + p2dPf + r2dr + t2dT* = 0                            (A.5) 
where, i2 = (∂C*/∂i)[PfQ″(C*) – 2g′.(1−n)T*(1+r(1−T*))] +T*(1+r(1−T*))] > 0 
                      (−)             (−)  
 
            n2 = 2g′.C*T*(1+r(1−T*)) > 0 
            p2 = (∂C*/∂Pf)[Pf.Q″(C*) – 2g′.(1−n)T*(1+r(1−T*))] + C*.Q″(C*) < 0 
                        (+)             (−)            (+)                                       (−) 
            r2 = (∂C*/∂r)[PfQ″(C*) − 2g′.(1−n)T*.(1+r(1−T*))] – C*.g′.(1−n)T*(1−T*) +(i−g).T*.(1−  
                                                                                                                             T*) 
Using (13), it can be rewritten as 
r2 = (∂C*/∂r)[Pf.Q″(C*) – 2g′.(1−n)T*.(1+r(1−T*))] – C*T*(1−T*)(dC*/di) > 0     
          (−)            (−)            (+)                                                                (−) 
t2 = (∂C*/∂T*).[PfQ″(C*) – 2g′.(1−n)T*.(1+r(1−T*))] – C*T*(1−2T*)(dC*/di) > 0  (if 1≥ 2T*) 
             (−)           (−)            (+)                                                                  (−) 
        
Now, (di/dPf)MM  =  − (n2 /i2) < 0    
                                    (+) (+) 
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(di/dPf)n=const  =  − (p2 /i2) > 0  
                                 (−)(+) 
(di/dr)n=const  =  − (r2 /i2) < 0.  
                               (+) (+) 
and, (di/dT*) =  − (t2 /i2) < 0 if 1≥ 2T*. 
                             (+) (+) 
 
Therefore, the MM curve is negatively sloped. The MM curve shifts upward to the right as Pf 
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Figure 2: Determination of Equilibrium n and i. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 